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Dating back at least to Cournot (1838), students of industrial organization have built formal models to gain insight about
product market competition among firms. A similarly rich tool-kit of formal models has been developed for
understanding incentive systems in organizations.1 For the most part, these two literatures have evolved independently.
Models of product market competition typically ignore the inner workings of firms, while models of incentives in
organizations pay scant attention to the firm's competitive environment. This disconnection is unfortunate because, in
many settings, the choices of product market and incentive strategies are inextricably linked. One such setting, of
particular importance to economics and public policy, is the delivery of medical services via managed care organizations.
In this paper we combine a model of a differentiated product oligopoly with a model of physician incentives to study how
competition between managed care organizations shapes the style of medical care physicians practice and, as a
consequence, the welfare of their members.
Since Congress passed the HMO Act of 1973, managed care has become the dominant form of health insurance in the
United States.2 Firms in this industry adopt a bewildering variety of organizational forms and acronyms such as: health
maintenance organizations (HMOs); preferred provider organizations (PPOs); and point-of-service plans (POSs).3 The
common characteristic of these plans and organizations is the combination of an insurance function with systems for
managing the actions physicians take on behalf of their patients. To help fix ideas, we will focus the subsequent discussion
on HMOs; in particular we model the network (or independent practice) HMOs that have become an important part of the
managed care industry.4 In contrast to the "staff model," HMOs in which physicians are hired as employees, network
HMOs typically do not  employ physicians. Rather they contract with individual physician practices (or with associations
of such practices) to provide medical services. The contracts that network HMOs write are usually non-exclusive,
meaning that individual physicians in the network can see patients who are not members of the HMO. The contractstypically also include monetary rewards for successfully controlling medical utilization costs. These cost control
incentives are the source of intense public controversy and high stakes litigation (Gosfield, 1997). 
The core issue in the public debate stems from the information asymmetries that prevent patients from directly evaluating
the quality of care provided by their physician. If patients cannot adequately assess care quality, critics fear that
competition will trigger an HMO led "race to the bottom" in which physicians operate under severe cost controls and
managed care plans offer only minimal levels of care.5 
To address this issue, we propose a model of the managed care market place that solves for both physician incentive
contracts and HMO product market strategies in an environment of extreme information asymmetry--physicians perceive
the quality of care they offer perfectly and their patients do not perceive it at all. Even under these stark conditions, we
find that competition between HMOs for patients and for physicians constrains "racing to the bottom."
At the center of our analysis is the process by which HMOs assemble physician networks and the role these networks play
in the competition for customers.6 Consistent with our assumption of extremely asymmetric information, we do not
directly include quality of care in consumers' preferences. In this set-up direct monitoring by consumers cannot play any
role in preventing HMOs from cutting costs by inducing physicians to provide low quality care. We instead model
potential HMO members as having preferences over the cost of insurance and the size of the HMO's physician network.
All potential members prefer larger networks because they are more likely to find a physician they like in larger
networks, but differ in their willingness to pay for this access. HMOs therefore can try to attract consumers by offering
access to a large network of physicians and/or by providing low costs.
Unlike consumers, physicians are assumed to understand the quality of care being delivered. In our model, physicians
dislike working under high powered, cost-containment incentives because these systems force them to adopt lower cost,
possibly less effective, practice styles. If physicians differ in how averse they are to medical cost-containment (and the
resulting changes in their practice style), then attracting large numbers of physicians to a network will require that the
HMO write relatively low-powered incentive contracts. An essential element of competitive strategy for HMOs will be the
resulting tradeoff between providing large physician networks and maintaining low prices. 
The result, as we will demonstrate below, is differentiated product market competition. Customers who place a relatively
high value on physician choice and a relatively low value on the cost of insurance will choose HMOs with large networks
and high premiums. Conversely, customers who place a relatively high value on low cost insurance will choose HMOs
with low premiums and small physician networks. Because assembling a large network of physicians requires relatively
lax cost controls, the HMOs will also provide differing practice styles, with the "up-market" HMO providing a relatively
generous practice to its members. The interaction between incentives and product market competition--consumers
demand large physician networks, and HMOs can only provide these networks by weakening cost-containment
incentives--acts to prevent a "race to the bottom." 
Once we derive equilibrium incentive contracts and medical practice styles, we use our model to examine the efficacy of
two commonly proposed regulatory strategies for limiting the influence of physician incentive contracts: (1) capping the
proportion of "at risk" income in physician contracts; and (2) making HMOs legally liable for the adverse medical
consequences attributed to their cost-containment systems. We find that both these policies have the intended effect of
reducing cost-pressures on physicians, but at the price of increasing the cost of medical services and decreasing the
proportion of the population with insurance coverage. Thus, the welfare implications of these policies are ambiguous.
Some members, particularly those with a high willingness to pay for physician choice, are made better off by these policy
interventions while others, particularly the newly uninsured, are made worse off.
All of our conclusions regarding quality of care depend on physicians having appropriate preferences about the style of
medicine they practice. In our model, we refer to these preferences as "norms of medical practice" and treat them as
having both an exogenous and endogenous component.7 The exogenous component of norms specifies the minimum cost
practice style a physician will tolerate. This minimum acceptable level of care is determined by exogenous factors such as
the state of medical knowledge, medical ethics, and the threat of malpractice suits. The endogenous component of norms
is based on relative, rather than absolute, levels of care. We posit that physicians are averse to offering less generous care
to some patients solely on the basis of these patients' HMO affiliation. Similarly, physicians dislike adopting a practice
style that affords less generous care than is provided by physicians elsewhere in the marketplace. These relative norms
may be driven by doctors' desire for social status, or simply by a fear of malpractice suits.8 In either case, the
endogenous component of norms implies that the willingness of physicians to accept an HMO's incentive contract will
depend on the incentive contracts prevailing elsewhere in the market place. The presence of these endogenous norms has
important economic implications: they amplify forces that move the market away from a "race to the bottom" while, at
the same time, reducing the scope for product differentiation between HMOs. Instead of racing to the bottom in search of
lower costs, HMOs may well find themselves pulled to the top by their need to attract physicians to their networks. The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the empirical evidence concerning physician
incentives. Section 3 presents the model and solves for an equilibrium. Section 4 applies the model to regulatory strategies
proposed for the managed care industry. We conclude by discussing directions for future research.
PHYSICIAL INCENTIVES AND MANAGED CARE 
Our model relies heavily on three stylized facts about physicians' responses to incentive schemes: (1) physicians will
respond to financial incentives by changing their practice style, (2) physicians' responses to financial incentives are shaped
by absolute and relative practice norms, and (3) HMOs take these norms into account when writing incentive contracts. In
this section we summarize evidence relating to these stylized facts.
Response to Incentives 
A number of recent econometric studies suggest that the practice style of physicians is influenced by the explicit and
implicit financial incentives under which they operate. Kessler and McClellan (1996), for example, find that reforms in
state malpractice laws have an economically and statistically significant effect on patient expenditures for the treatment of
heart disease.9 Barro and Beaulieu (2000) study the effect of a switch from fixed salary to profit sharing at a set of
physician practices owned by a hospital chain. They find that the introduction of a performance-based pay plan increased
profitability significantly, primarily because physicians increased the number of patients they saw.10 Barro and Beaulieu's
study looked at compensation practices in a fee for service setting. In contrast, Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor (2001)
examine the effect of cost-containment incentives within the type of HMO network we model. The HMO they studied
wrote incentive contracts with each of the physicians in their network. These contracts provided substantial monetary
rewards to those primary care physicians who kept the medical utilization charges of their patients below target levels.
The study found that the incentive contracts led to reduced medical utilization costs, with physicians sharing in the
financial benefits of these cost reductions. The common conclusion of these studies is that physicians' choice of practice
style does respond to financial incentives.11
Incentives and Physician Practice Norms 
In making the case for the importance of physician practice norms in the analysis of incentives, we rely on both direct
and indirect evidence. Direct evidence that physicians experience disutility when incentives are perceived to influence the
level of care quality comes from a recent survey of physician attitudes published in the New England Journal of
Medicine . This paper states: "Our findings suggest that bonuses based on limitation of referrals and on productivity
heighten physicians' "performance anxiety" and their perceptions that care may be compromised in these areas…"
(Grumbach et.al. 1998; p. 1520). The same study also reports that when physicians perceive pressure to limit referrals or
improve productivity in ways that compromise care, their satisfaction with their practice declines.
Where one might interpret the survey results as indicating the presence of absolute practice norms, there is also indirect
evidence suggesting the importance of relative practice norms. It is well established that physicians' practice styles have a
local flavor, varying in persistent and meaningful ways from one location to another.12 The source of these "small area
variations" remains mysterious--they are not accounted for by variations in underlying clinical conditions, cost of
treatment, or patient incomes. Some analysts have suggested that these geographic practice patterns are the result of
physicians learning by observing the practice style and clinical decisions of other physicians in the vicinity (Phelps 1992).
In other words, physicians' norms for acceptable practices are not necessarily based on some absolute external standard,
but instead are determined endogenously by the practices of other physicians in the area. To the extent that physicians are
responsive to financial incentives, this implies that the efficacy of one HMO's incentive plan will depend on the incentive
plans being used by other HMOs in the area.
Another piece of evidence supporting the existence of physician norms, as well as HMOs' sensitivity to these norms,
comes from studying the incentive contracts HMOs offer their physicians. If physicians dislike incentives that force them
to compromise care, one might expect HMOs to write incentive contracts in ways that mitigate incentive pressure for
patients most in need of care. This is what Gaynor et al (2001) found in their case study described above. Specifically,
they found that the HMO relied on incentive contracts with built-in safeguards to protect seriously ill patients. For the
purposes of calculating cost-containment bonuses, the primary care physicians in the HMO's network were only held
responsible for the first $15,000 of costs per year generated by each patient. This "stop-loss" provision was intended to
remove cost-containment pressures for seriously ill patients and the statistical evidence presented by Gaynor et al
suggests that it had the intended effect. That this provision was aimed at physicians and not consumers is evident in how
the HMO viewed it within their overall strategy. The general impression at the HMO was that purchasers were much
more responsive to premium levels and the number of physicians in the network than to assertions regarding quality. The
physician incentive contracts were not advertised and even if the contracts had become common knowledge, they were so
complex that only the most sophisticated buyers would have been able to understand the significance of the stop-loss
provisions. In other words, the incentive contract was weakened not to attract patients through a more permissive style ofmedical practice, but rather to attract physicians. 
This evidence on HMO incentive contracts comes from a case study of a single organization. Ideally we would like to
know more generally whether HMOs shape incentives to accommodate physician practice norms. No general database of
HMO contracts exists, but we can infer something more about these incentive contracts by examining the effect of HMOs
on care quality. If HMOs did not try to shape incentives in accordance with physician norms, one would expect to see
corresponding effects on the quality of clinical outcomes. However, the few econometric studies that have directly
examined the issue have generally found no HMO effect on care outcomes. Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000)
compare the treatment for HMO members with others insured by traditional indemnity plans. They find that HMOs have
30% to 40% lower expenditures than traditional plans, but that actual treatments and health outcomes differ little across
types of plans. Similar results are found in a study of cost and treatment patterns for Massachusetts state and local
government employees by Altman, Cutler, and Zeckhauser (2000). They studied costs and treatment intensity for eight
serious medical conditions. The authors found that average HMO costs were 40 percent lower than those of an indemnity
plan offering insurance to the same pool of employees. However, these lower costs are due to selection and the HMO's
ability to negotiate low prices for treatments, not to any difference in the treatments used. 
We interpret the absence of an HMO effect on clinical outcomes for serious illnesses as reflecting the reluctance of HMOs
to push physicians into treatment decisions that they might find objectionable for either moral or legal reasons.13
A MODEL OF PHYSICIAN INCENTIVES AND HMO COMPETITION 
We model competition among HMOs as an extensive form game with three stages. The players in this game are two
HMOs and the population of doctors that might treat patients insured by these HMOs.14 In the first stage of the game, the
HMOs simultaneously set the number of doctors they want in their network and the quantity of HMO members they
intend to service. Prices for each HMO are then set to clear the market.15 In the second stage of the game, the HMOs
write incentive contracts for the physicians in their network. HMOs are constrained to write contracts that yield the
promised number of physicians for their network. In the final stage of the game, doctors make two related decisions:
which HMO (or HMOs) to join and what style of medical practice to adopt. Both of these decisions are shaped by the
incentive contracts HMOs offer. We use subgame perfection as a solution concept and solve the model via backward
induction. Our exposition of the model therefore begins with the final stage and works backward in time to reach the first
stage.
Stage 3: Physician Choice of Network Affiliation and Practice Style 
Consider an HMO whose network is composed entirely of primary care physicians. In this HMO, PCPs are "responsible"
for the care of their panel of HMO members in both a clinical and economic sense. Clinically, primary care physicians
must approve any actions that incur medical utilization costs, e.g. drug prescriptions, referrals to specialists etc.
Economically, primary care physicians are also held "responsible", via incentive contracts, for the medical costs incurred
by their patients. Managing care by making the primary care physician the "gatekeeper" to resources is common in the
managed care industry. 
The HMO writes incentive contracts with the primary care physicians in its network. For simplicity we focus on linear
contracts having two parameters, a capitation rate and a cost share.16 The capitation rate for incentive contracts offered
by HMO i, represented by ki, is a flat fee that the HMO pays the physician for each HMO member in the physician's
patient panel. The cost share parameter for HMO i, represented by di, is the fraction of incurred medical costs that the
physician must bear. Without loss of generality, we assume that it is HMO 1 that will have the relatively low powered
incentives and HMO 2 that has the high powered incentives, i.e. that d2>d1.
If incentives are to matter, physicians must be free to adopt different styles of medical practice in response to different
levels of cost sharing. Think of these medical styles as short-hand descriptions of the strategies primary care physicians
use to treat the patients that arrive in their office. For example, a primary care physician may decide to send every case
of acne to a dermatologist and every ankle sprain to a sports medicine specialist. This style of medical practice would
typically generate more medical expenses than one in which the primary care physician tried to treat the acne or the
sprains themselves. We index practice styles by s  and think of s as increasing with the costliness of a practice style. More
specifically we write the cost per patient of a physician adopting practice style s as:
c(s) =  s2     (1)
Physicians make choices about their practice style based on a combination of clinical and financial considerations. In
writing down physicians' preferences over practice styles, we assume that a higher practice style is, ceteris paribus,
preferable. As professionals, physicians have a sense of what resources patients themselves  would choose to have spent ontheir medical treatment if patients had the knowledge and information to make these decisions. In addition, physicians
may have intellectual or scientific motives to use the latest and best technology on their patients. Physicians may also
practice "defensive medicine" and use tests and procedures to preempt future malpractice suits. Each of these factors will
cause physicians to prefer more expensive over less expensive styles. Indeed, if physicians did not generally prefer more
expensive practice styles, there would be little need for HMOs to write contracts with incentives for controlling costs. 
We incorporate absolute physician norms into the model by assuming there exists a minimum acceptable practice style 
for each physician. This norm acts largely through doctors' participation decisions for the HMOs.17 We stipulate that a
physician will join a network if this action meets two criteria. First, being a member of the network must generate
non-negative utility when operating with the utility-maximizing practice style (as derived below in (3) - (5)). Second, this
utility maximizing practice style must be greater than  , the minimal acceptable practice style. Under our maintained
assumption that patients do not have the information or expertise to adequately assess physician practice styles, it is a
physician's judgment about what is minimally acceptable rather than the marginal patient's preferences, which limits the
physician's choice of styles. We capture heterogeneity in physician judgments by allowing   to be uniformly distributed
on the interval 0 to A, where A > 0.
To incorporate relative practice norms, we assume that physicians observe the practice style adopted by other physicians
in the market and experience a reduction in utility when they adopt a practice style that is lower than the most expensive
style prevailing in the market. There are at least three reasons why physicians may compare their practice style to the
maximum style prevailing in the market. First, they may themselves have patients in both HMOs in the market and they
may dislike offering less expensive treatment to patients in HMO 2 (where incentive contracts are higher-powered) than
HMO 1. Second, there may be status-seeking behavior under which physicians aim to "keep up with the Jones" in terms of
the medical treatments they offer their patients. Finally, it may be that physicians who practice a style of medicine that is
relatively less expensive than other physicians feel more vulnerable to malpractice claims.
Formally, let   denote the maximum style present in the local market and  si( -si) the disutility derived from offering a
style below the maximum.19 The variable   is positive, implying that as long as si> /2, marginal reductions in practice
style reduce physician utility. When si= /2 the disutility of choosing an inexpensive practice style is maximized, so
beyond this point (si< /2) we assume the marginal effect of further reductions in si is 0.20
Letting qi be the number of patients the physician has from HMO i, we combine physician preferences for income, their
preferences for more expensive styles of practice, the disutility generated by relative practice norms, and the constraints




where 0   di   0 and   > 0. The first term of (2a) is the income earned for each member served from HMO i, the second
term is the per-member utility derived from the direct returns to adopting a costly practice style, and the final term is the
disutility from choosing a practice style below the maximum. 
Having fully specified the utility function, we can now determine the style physicians adopt after choosing to join an
HMO. Conditional on having joined, we get the following first order condition for doctors in HMO i's network.21
 
To close the model, (4) adds in the equilibrium condition that   equals the higher of the two practice styles chosen by
physicians.
 
Noting that s2 < s1 because d2 > d1 by construction, doctors will choose the following styles in HMO1 and HMO 2: 
The important point to take away from (5) is that increases in incentives to control costs (represented by increases in d1
or d2) have the effect of reducing the costliness of the practice styles physicians adopt. 
Stage 2: Incentive Contracts and HMO Cost Functions 
In this stage of the game, HMOs have committed to attracting a certain number of doctors,  i, to their network. In the
network HMOs we analyze here, a doctor "joins" a network by agreeing to receive HMO members as patients, thereby
accepting the HMO's incentive contract. Specifically, the doctor agrees to receive the capitation rate, k, and the cost share
parameter, d. 
HMO 1 chooses values of k and d to minimize per patient costs subject to the participation constraints that must be met to
build a network with  1 doctors.22 Recall that by assumption d1 < d2, implying that physicians in HMO 1's network will
employ a higher (or more costly) practice style than those in HMO 2's network. Let D be the total number of available
physicians. HMO 1's cost minimization problem is as follows, where s1 is a function of d1.
 
In (7) we give the two physician participation constraints. The first constraint, that physicians must always have
non-negative utility under HMO 1's incentive contract, holds with equality. Otherwise, the HMO could always reduce
costs by cutting ki. 
The second participation constraint states that if HMO 1 wishes to attract  1 physicians to its network, it must write a
contract such that the optimal style chosen by physicians working under these contracts equals or exceeds what the
marginal physician judges to be the minimum acceptable practice style.23 Cost minimization requires that this
participation constraint must also hold with equality. If it did not, the HMO could always reduce costs further by
increasing the share parameter, d1.24 Thus it is the marginal physician's judgment of the minimum acceptable style,
rather than the judgment of the marginal HMO member, that determines the style that prevails in the HMO. Substituting
(7) into (6) we derive HMO 1's cost function.
 
We derive HMO 2's cost function analogously. HMO 2 chooses d2 and k2 to minimize per patient costs while attracting  2
physicians into its network.
 
The constraints in (10) are the same as those for HMO 1 except for the final term of the first constraint,  s2(s1 - s2). This
term reflects payments that HMO 2 must give physicians to compensate them for the disutility of practicing at less than
the highest style. Comparing the participation constraints in (7) and (10), it is clear that the physicians who join HMO 2's
network will be a strict subset of those who join HMO 1's physician network.25
In HMO 2, as in HMO 1, cost minimization ensures that both participation constraints hold with equality. Substituting
(10) into (9) we derive the cost function given by (11). Note that HMO 2's costs depend on the size of HMO 1's network.
The size of these cost spillovers depends on the strength of physicians' relative practice norms: the more potent the
relative norms, the greater the spillover26  
Stage 1: Market Equilibrium
We begin by considering the preferences of the consumers in the market. Each consumer can decide to purchase
membership in one of the two HMOs or to purchase no health insurance at all. To highlight the information asymmetries
that raise fears of a "race to the bottom," we adopt the strong assumption that consumers cannot perceive the style of care
provided by physicians in the network nor can they infer this style from the size of HMO's networks . Consumers in our
model do, however, have preferences over physicians and anticipate that they are more likely to find a physician they like
in larger networks.27
For these reasons, we posit that, ceteris paribus, consumers prefer HMOs with large physician networks. More formally,
we assign each consumer a parameter, x, that determines the strength of preferences for physician choice and hence
network size. This parameter is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, X] with X indicating the greatest possible
preference for access to a larger network of doctors. We write a consumer's utility in terms of premium costs, p, and
network size,  . Since all consumers prefer larger networks ceteris paribus, b is strictly positive.
 
By identifying the value of x for the marginal members of HMOs 1 and 2, we can use the consumer's utility function to
derive inverse demand functions. For convenience, we assume that the total population size is also X. We maintain our
notational convention that HMO 1 has relatively low-powered incentives, which is equivalent to assuming that HMO 1
chooses to provide a larger network of physicians ( 1  2). Therefore HMO 2 will set a price such that the marginal
member will be indifferent between joining HMO 2 and going without insurance.28
 
Likewise, HMO 1 will select a price so that the marginal member of HMO 1 is indifferent between joining either HMO 1
or HMO 2.
 
Using these inverse demand functions, we can write the HMOs' profit functions as:
 
The two HMOs simultaneously choose their respective levels of q and  . In the Nash equilibrium, each HMO maximizes
its profits taking q and   for the other HMO as fixed. Thus the equilibrium must satisfy the four following first-order
conditions:29 
 
It is straight-forward, if tedious, to solve this system of first-order conditions for closed form expressions of each HMO's
equilibrium values of q and  : 
Fulfilling the first-order conditions given by (17) through (20), along with the second-order conditions, guarantees that
each HMO's equilibrium strategy is a local maximum of the payoff function given the other's choice. Because the payoff
functions are not quasi-concave, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium. In technical notes
available from the authors we prove that equations (21) through (24) represent a global profit maximum for each firm as
well.30 We also show that the second-order conditions hold. 
Combining (22) and (24), we get the following relationship between the equilibrium network sizes of the two HMOs.
 
It follows that our assumption of product differentiation ( 2 <  1), requires that that     0.5 . Thus HMOs will engage in
product differentiation provided that relative practice norms are not "too strong" relative to the costs incurred by more
generous practice styles.
Having solved for equilibrium values of q and   for each HMO, it is trivial to solve for equilibrium prices, profits and
costs for each HMO. Given that the marginal physician's participation constraints hold with equality for both HMOs, it is
similarly easy to derive the equilibrium incentive pay parameters, k and d, and physician practice style, s, for each HMO.
Increases in   must  be accompanied by a reduction in d and an increase in s. 
Discussion of the Market Equilibrium
In the introduction to this paper we raised the possibility of a "race to the bottom" in the quality of care provided by
HMOs. Under this scenario, HMOs, responding to competitive pressures, slash costs by employing powerful incentive
contracts with physicians. Consumers, unable to judge the quality of care they are getting and thereby unable to vote with
their feet, end up receiving increasingly poor medical care. The occurrence of such a downward spiral in care quality
seems plausible, but examining the equilibrium described by equations (21)-(24) suggests that such fears may be
unfounded. 
To make this discussion more concrete we need to define what is meant by the market hitting "bottom." An obvious but
extreme definition of the bottom is when HMOs uniformly offer the lowest feasible level of care. For our model, this
would be equivalent to saying all HMOs induce a practice style, s, equal to zero, the minimum acceptable to any physician
in the market place. By examination of (22) and (24), we can see that no such "race to the bottom" occurs. This result is
driven by the presence of absolute practice norms. Even if we eliminated all competition from our model and analyzed a
monopoly, an HMO without any doctors is like a car without an engine. The need to get at least some physicians to join its
network will force all HMOs to induce a style above the minimum.
Even with less extreme definitions, no race to the bottom is observed in our model. For example, we might say
competition causes a race to the bottom if all HMOs are pushed down to the lowest practice style provided within the
market. Once again, this does not occur. As long as   is not too large, the market will offer differentiated products and,
by extension, differing practice styles.31 HMO 1 charges consumers a relatively high price for the combination of weak
physician incentives and large physician networks that yield a more generous style of medicine. HMO 2, in contrast,
offers lower premiums and induces its physicians to adopt a more cost-conscious medical style by writing high-powered
incentive contracts. HMO 1 is better off differentiating itself from HMO 2 and enjoying market power in its chosen niche
than trying to race HMO 2 for the lowest costs of providing medical care. Once again, physicians' absolute practice
norms are playing a critical role. Unlike many industrial organization models, cutting costs does not necessarily make you
a stronger competitor here. Tougher cost control incentives come at the price of offering a less attractive product toconsumers--specifically, an HMO will have to offer a smaller physician network. For an HMO that has specialized in
providing its customers with a plethora of physician options, this is an undesirable tradeoff. In a world with product
differentiation, HMOs don't race to the bottom, they race to their market niches.
If the combination of product differentiation and absolute physician norms vitiates a "race to the bottom", relative
practice norms introduce a "pull to the top". To see this, consider the effect on equilibrium strategies of increasing the
potency of physicians' relative practice norms, i.e. of increasing the parameter  . Differentiating (21) through (24) with
respect to   and maintaining the necessary and sufficient condition for product differentiation (    0.5 ) we get the
following:
 
From (29), we find increasing the importance of relative practice norms causes HMO 2 to increase the size of its
physician network. This is to be expected as heightened relative practice norms increase the cost of getting physicians to
adopt a practice style less generous than HMO 1's. It therefore becomes less advantageous for HMO 2 to strongly
differentiate itself from HMO 1 by using tight incentives to keep costs (and hence prices) down for its plan. As HMO 2's
network size increases, cost-containment incentives are reduced and premiums rise. HMO 1 responds to HMO 2's
incursion into the "up scale" insurance market by increasing the size of its own network as shown by (27). The presence
of relative practice norms acts as a brake on any race to the bottom, pulling the practice styles of both HMOs up above
what would otherwise prevail.32
A final comparative static result can be found by differentiating (25):
 
When relative practice norms increase in importance, product differentiation falls as the low cost HMO becomes more
similar to the high cost HMO. Thus the "pull from the top" due to relative practice norms causes the low-cost HMO to
more closely approximate the high-cost HMO's incentive and product market strategies. 
To summarize, absolute physician norms and product differentiation combine to prevent a race to the bottom in quality of
care, even in the presence of severe informational asymmetries. Relative norms about practice styles act as a pull from
the top, moving the quality of care in all market niches to even higher levels. 
This conclusion raises a natural question: do the relative physician norms that undermine low-cost/high incentive HMOs
also increase consumer welfare?33 The answer turns out to be ambiguous. From (26) and (28) we see that an increase in 
reduces the number of consumers choosing either HMO 1 or HMO 2. Since an increase in   reduces membership in both
HMOs, there must occur a corresponding increase in the number of uninsured. These newly uninsured are, by revealed
preference, worse off than before the increase in  . After all, they had the opportunity to opt out of insurance before the
increase in premiums and preferred to purchase insurance. However, it can also be shown that utility increases for
consumers with a sufficiently strong willingness to pay for physician choice.34 Other consumers with less willingness to
pay for large physician networks are made worse by increasing relative practice norms, even though they remain insured.
For these consumers, the increase in premiums resulting from an increase in   will lead to a reduction in utility even
though they gain access to more physicians. To summarize, an increase in physician practice norms helps consumers who
care most about access to large networks and harms those who are most sensitive to prices. 
PUBLIC POLICY 
Concern over the adverse consequences of "managed care" has grown with the increased importance of HMOs in the U.S.healthcare system. Although the managed care industry has always been subject to regulation at the federal and state level
(see Robinson 1999), there is growing interest in public policy that more directly influences HMO incentive systems
(Gosfield 1997). 
In this section, we consider two broad regulatory strategies for shaping physician incentives: (1) imposing caps on the
proportion of "at risk" income allowed in physician contracts; and (2) making HMOs legally liable for the adverse
medical consequences attributed to their cost-containment systems. The first strategy is embodied in physician incentive
plan (PIP) regulations implemented in 1997 by the Health Care Financing Administration (Gosfield 1997). These
regulations required that incentive contracts could not place more than 25% of physician income "at risk," i.e. no more
than 25% of income could be linked to performance objectives.35 The second strategy is embodied in proposals to modify
the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) in order to make HMOs liable for damages linked to their
cost-containment systems (Havighurst 2000). Some of these proposed changes to ERISA have, in recent years, been
included in various proposals for "Patients' Bill of Rights" or "Patient Protection Act" legislation (Studdert, Sage,
Gresenz, and Hensler 1999).36
Analyzing Caps on Physician Incentives
In terms of our model, we can analyze the impact of caps on incentive contracts by considering the effect of a regulation
that compels HMO 2 (the high incentive/low cost HMO) to move the incentive parameter, d, below its equilibrium level.
Since cost minimization requires that the two physician participation constraints hold with equality--each HMO selects the
highest level of d consistent with providing the promised number of physicians--forcing HMO 2 to decrease d implies that
it will increase the size of its physician network to the maximum feasible given the legally mandated cap on d. Intuitively,
if HMO 2 has to carry the higher medical utilization costs that come with relaxing physician incentives, it will also seek to
exploit the chief benefit of lax incentives-- the ability to attract more physicians to its network. 
Thus we can treat incentive caps as if they were rules mandating an increase in the size of HMO 2's network to the
maximum feasible under the legislatively determined level of d. Formally, let  2
* be the mandated size for HMO 2's
network. We assume this constraint is binding--in other words, HMO 2 is forced to use weaker incentives than it would in
the absence of the constraint. To get equilibrium values for q1,  1, and q2, we would like to solve the system of equations
given by (17) through (20) but with (20) replaced by the constraint  2 =  2
*. Closed form solutions to this problem are
too complex to present in this paper, but for policy purposes all we need are derivatives for q1,  1, and q2 with respect to
2
*. These derivatives turn out to be relatively simple:37 
 
Intuitively, the positive relationship between  1 and  2
* occurs because an increase in the size of HMO 2's physician
network reduces HMO 1's advantage with patients who highly value large networks. To regain its comparative advantage,
HMO 1 must broaden its own network. For both HMOs, increases in their network size lead to increases in the marginal
cost of serving an additional patient. Thus, imposing a binding regulation on HMO 2 has the effect of reducing the total
number of members who join any HMO.
The welfare effects of capping incentives are similar to those described in Section 3 for increases in the strength of
relative practice norms. Since both q1 and q2 are decreasing functions of  2
*, the number of uninsured individuals must
increase as caps on physician incentives become more binding. Those who become uninsured as a result of incentive caps
are, by revealed preference, made worse off by the regulations. Of the remaining insured, those with sufficiently high
willingness to pay for physician choice will be made better off while others, with a smaller willingness to pay for choice,
will experience a decline in utility. Even though these individuals benefit from access to larger networks, this gain is
offset by having to pay increased premiums.
Changes In HMO's Legal Liability
We have so far focused on interventions that cap the intensity of physician incentives. We now consider an alternative
regulatory strategy: making HMOs liable for medical malpractice linked to their cost-containment systems. Malpractice suits have become a major cost of practicing medicine, with physicians typically paying substantial amounts
of money for medical malpractice insurance. Indeed, this is why we argued above that the threat of malpractice suits is
one of the factors shaping physicians' absolute and relative practice norms. In designing incentive contracts with doctors,
HMOs must account for all the costs generated by serving a patient, including any costs due to malpractice. The incentive
contract serves as a means of assigning these costs either to the physician or to the HMO. Under the current regulatory
regime, HMOs already bear some of the expected costs of malpractice suits against physicians even though nominally all
of these costs fall on physicians. Simply altering ERISA to allow plaintiffs to name HMOs as defendants in malpractice
suits will, ceteris paribus, likely have no  effect on the equilibrium practice styles that characterize HMO networks.
Legally reassigning some portion of malpractice costs to the HMO doesn't generally affect the equilibrium incentive
contracts, since other costs can be reassigned to the physicians to yield the original incentive structure.
ERISA reforms will  have an effect, however, if the naming of HMOs as defendants has influences the magnitude of
damages awarded by juries. A recent series of papers examining jury behavior have found that punitive damage awards
are influenced not only by the facts of the case but also by the identity of the defendants. Large organizations with deep
pockets are typically hit with higher punitive damage awards than smaller organizations (Kahneman, Schkade, and
Sunstein 1998). If, by virtue of their size and deep pockets, HMO defendants in medical malpractice suits incur larger
punitive damage awards than physician defendants do, we can expect changes in ERISA to affect the behavior of HMOs.
In the following analysis we discuss two channels through which HMO malpractice liability can influence equilibrium
outcomes: (1) if increased jury awards increase fixed costs per patient; and (2) if increased jury awards raise the
incidence of various forms of "defensive" medical practices. As we will discuss below, "defensive medicine" can be
represented in our model in three different ways. In the interest of brevity, we state the likely effect of these changes
without providing formal proof (see Table 1 for a summary). To the extent that these results don't follow directly from
what has been shown above, proofs are available from the authors upon request.
Increases in Fixed Cost per Patient 
By assumption, we have set the fixed cost of serving an additional patient equal to zero. We can expect, however, that
changes in ERISA leading to higher malpractice damages will lead to an increase in the fixed cost of taking on a patient.
Technically, fixed costs appear as a constant on the right hand side of (17) and (19), the first order conditions for HMO 1
and 2 with respect to quantity. It can be shown that an increase in this fixed cost increases network size and decreases
quantity of patients served for HMO 2. The intuition behind this result is straight forward--because quantity has become
relatively more expensive, the HMO substitutes from quantity towards larger network size. For HMO 1 the results are
reversed, with quantity rising and network size falling.38 Although the number of members of HMO 1 increases, the
overall  effect of the increase in fixed costs is a decrease in the total number of patients insured by HMOs. This follows
because the decrease in quantity for HMO 2 is larger than the increase for HMO 1. As we discussed above, these newly
uninsured are always made worse off by the change. The welfare effects for those individuals remaining insured is
ambiguous.
Increase in the Incidence of Defensive Medicine
Increased malpractice damages due to changes in ERISA can be expected to make "defensive medicine" more attractive as
a means of containing legal costs. By defensive medicine we mean the spending of resources on medical care that has little
clinical value, but helps limit liability in the event of a law suit. In terms of our model, an increase in defensive medical
practices can be represented in three ways: by a decrease in the effect that costly practice styles have on costs ( ); by an
increase in the minimum acceptable practice style,  ; and/or by an increase in the cost of practicing a relatively
inexpensive style of practice,  . We discuss each of these in turn.
We have already indicated that part of the relationship between choice of practice style, s, and medical costs is due to the
expected costs of malpractice suits. If the expected awards in malpractice suits increase, then costly defensive medical
practices can actually reduce the marginal cost of adopting these expensive practice styles. In terms of our model, this
means that   falls as expected jury awards increase.39 This parameter change causes the equilibrium quantity of patients
insured to (weakly) decrease for both HMOs and network size to increase for both HMOs. Intuitively, the decrease in 
makes expensive practice styles more attractive for HMOs. This effect is sufficiently strong to overwhelm the direct
effect on quantity from decreasing costs per patient (due to decreasing  ).
A second plausible effect of changes in ERISA that increase the size of malpractice awards is to make HMOs desire a
more generous practice style than physicians would otherwise choose in equilibrium. To induce more generous practice
styles, HMOs need to weaken the incentive intensity of their physician contracts with resulting effects on network sizes
and quantities of patients served. Formally, this change is equivalent to a cap on incentive parameter d  in the low-cost
HMO. We know the effects of such a change from the preceding section: both HMOs in the market will adopt
lower-powered incentives and build larger physician networks. As a result, each HMO will attract fewer members and thenumber of uninsured will rise. 
The third channel by which changes in ERISA could influence HMO management is via the relative  generosity of the
practice style prevailing in the network. Consider a malpractice case in which a doctor is charged with malpractice for
treating a patient in HMO 2 of our model. Imagine that the question at issue is that the physician did not recommend a
controversial and expensive procedure that physicians in HMO 2's network do not offer but which physicians in HMO 1's
network routinely offer. If the jury finds in favor of the plaintiff, Kahneman et. al's results suggest that the damage
awards will be greater if the HMO and the physician are plaintiffs than if the physician alone were the plaintiff. From this
motivating example, it is not hard to imagine that changes in ERISA can be especially hard on the low-cost HMO in a
market. By increasing the costs of using a practice style below that of its competitor, this policy change puts pressure on
HMO 2 to weaken its cost-control incentives. We can capture this effect in our model as an increase in  , the cost of
adopting a relatively  inexpensive practice style. From (26)-(29), we know what the effects of an increase in   will be.
The low-cost HMO will reduce the incentive intensity of its physician contracts and increase the size of its physician
network. HMO 1 will respond to HMO 2's entry into its market segment by doing the same thing: reducing incentives and
increasing network size. The net result is that membership in both HMOs fall while the number of uninsured increase. 
To sum up, an ERISA induced increase in defensive medicine (seen as decreases in  ; increases in  * and  ), will increase
the number of uninsured. We know by revealed preference that individuals who become uninsured must be made worse
off. For individuals who remain insured, those with high willingness to pay for access to large physician networks will
benefit while those who are more price sensitive will be harmed.
Discussion of Policy Results 
We have considered the likely effects of two broad strategies for limiting an HMO's ability to impose cost containment
incentives on physicians. Our results indicate that both of these strategies will have the likely effect of increasing medical
costs and increasing the number of uninsured. The newly uninsured are always made worse off by these interventions.
The welfare effects on those remaining insured are murky--with some consumers being made worse off and others better
off. 
Should we conclude that regulating physician incentive systems is a bad policy idea? Not necessarily. There are important
externalities to health care that may not be fully captured in the factors that constrain HMO behavior: physician practice
norms, customer preferences for physician choice, and expected awards for malpractice. Some of these externalities
involve health outcomes-- if more expensive treatments are also more effective then financing these treatments may
improve the welfare of care givers and family members who are not directly involved in the purchase of the health care
insurance. Other externalities involve the physician-patient relationship--the use of high-powered financial incentives
anywhere may undermine patients' willingness to trust in and listen to their doctors' advice. If the net social value of
more expensive practice styles or restrictions on contracting exceeds their private value, there remains a strong case for
interventions limiting the ways that HMO's regulate care. 
The lesson of our analysis is not  that policy interventions are necessarily a bad idea, but rather that they must be
undertaken with an understanding of their cost--especially the increase in the number of uninsured.40 Policies regulating
HMO incentive systems will be more effective if implemented in conjunction with policies that increase access to care for
the uninsured.
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have studied the interaction between the incentive contracts that Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) write with physicians and product market competition among HMOs. The central economic and policy question
is whether, in an environment where consumers cannot assess the quality of care they receive, competition among HMOs
will lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of care quality. The results of our model suggest that, even in a setting with
extreme asymmetric information, this concern may be unfounded. HMOs are constrained from "racing to the bottom" by
an interaction between absolute physician practice norms and product market competition. In fact, relative practice norms
may act as a force "pulling to the top."
We also consider the implications of our model for public policy designed to limit the intensity of HMO incentive
systems. We analyze two such policies: caps on "at risk" physician income and legal changes that make HMOs directly
liable for damages caused by their incentive systems. Our results suggest that medical costs and premia will rise as a
result of these policies causing the number of uninsured to increase. The newly uninsured are clearly made worse off by
these interventions while the welfare effect on those remaining in the insurance system is complex, with some consumers
gaining and others losing. It follows that policies aimed at regulating HMO incentive systems could be made more
efficacious if they also involved actions to improve access to health care for the uninsured.Our model highlights a number of still unresolved empirical and theoretical issues that are worthy of further study. Of
these, perhaps the most important is understanding the determinants and scope of physician practice norms. At present
these norms are only dimly understood by economists. Further research into the formation and operation of norms is
critical for understanding the impact of incentives in healthcare and in the many other settings where critical outcomes
hinge on the decisions and actions of highly skilled professionals.
Table 1:
Sign of Predicted Effects of Making HMOs Liable in Malpractice Suits







Increase in the Incidence of "Defensive 
Medicine" Due to Higher Malpractice
Awards. 
Representation of Policy
Change in Formal Model  Fixed Cost     2
*    
Insured by HMO 1 (q1)  - - + -
HMO 1 Network Size (d1)  + + - +
Insured by HMO 2 (q2)  - - - -
HMO 2 Network Size (d2)  + + + +
Total Insured (q1+q2)  - - - -
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Appendix 1: Relative Norms and Consumer Welfare: We consider the effect of an increase in the strength of
relative norms on consumer's welfare. Differentiating the consumer's utility function (12) we get the following:
 
We have already shown that d /d >0 for members of either HMO and that dp/d is independent of x.  From this it follows
that du/d  is an increasing function of x. We can prove that du/d  > 0 for a segment of the market by identifying the
consumer with the minimum value of x  for whichdu/d  > 0.41To determine the welfare effects of increasing   for consumers originally in HMO 1, we evaluate du/d  for the consumer
in HMO 1 with the weakest willingness to pay for physician choice. This marginal consumer has x = X - q1 and it is easy
to show the following:42
 
Therefore, an increase in relative practice norms benefits all consumers with a willingness to pay strong enough to choose
HMO 1.
The story is more complex for consumers that initially choose HMO 2. We know that some consumers in HMO 2, those
with relatively low values of x, are made worse off by increased   (du/d  < 0) because some of them choose to become
uninsured. Similarly, we know from (A2) that some consumers in HMO 2 with relatively high values of x are made
better off by increased   (du/d >0).43 Since du/d  is a monotonic function of x, there must exist some value of x such
that du/d |x = 0. 
Rather than solving for this breakpoint directly, it is simpler to solve for the proportion of consumers using HMO 2 who
are made worse off by an increase in  . Define the function  (x) as follows:  (x)  x-(X - q1 - q2). This function gives
the number of patients in HMO 2 whose willingness to pay for larger networks is less than x. Combining this definition
with the utility function given by (12) and the price function for HMO 2 given by (13), we can rewrite the consumer's
utility function as u( 2, ) = b 2  for any consumer in HMO 2. Let  * be the value of   where consumers are
indifferent about an increase in  .. Differentiating u by   and solving for du/d  = 0 yields (A3).
 
Dividing  * by q2, we can solve for the proportion of consumers in HMO 2 who are harmed by an increase in relative
practice norms:
 
This ratio is positive as long as the condition for product differentiation ( <0.5 ) holds. Thus some positive proportion of
HMO 2 members are hurt by an increase in relative practice norms.
NOTES 
  1. For recent reviews of the incentives literature see Gibbons and Waldman (1999); and Prendergast (1999). For a
comprehensive discussion of the literature on physician incentives see McGuire (2000). 
  2. Ma and McGuire (forthcoming) cite evidence that roughly 75% of the privately insured in the U.S. receive health
care under some form of management by their health plan. 
  3. See Fox (1997) and Robinson (1999) for institutional background. 
  4. These entities comprise one of the largest segments of the managed care market, roughly 40 percent of total HMO
enrollment in 1998 (InterStudy, 1999). 
  5. While our exposition focuses on network HMOs, our key conclusions can extend to any type of managed careorganization. For this reason, we drop the term "network HMO" in favor of the more parsimonious term HMO. 
  6. In the market for commercial health insurance, the "customers" for whom the HMOs compete are typically
employers who purchase insurance on behalf of their employees. Competition for employees will compel employers to
choose policies with features their employees desire. Indeed, in a perfectly competitive labor market, employers would
choose insurance plans with the same combination of cost and quality that the marginal employee would choose for
herself. Thus, we simplify our discussion by leaving the employer out of the picture. We treat each individual employee
as if they were the HMO's direct customer. 
  7. We use the term "norms" to highlight the fact that physicians derive utility directly from the delivery of appropriate
medical care (in addition to the utility derived from the income generated by the provision of medical services). For a
discussions of norm based decision making in economic transactions see Kandel and Lazear (1992) and March (1994). 
  8. The social comparisons in our model of relative practice norms are similar to Encinosa, Gaynor, and Rebtizer
(2001), Gaynor and Rebitzer's (2001) model of physician medical practices, and to Kranton's model of social identity
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000). 
  9. This result also informs our analysis of public policies that alter HMO legal liability for malpractice claims. 
  10. Barro and Beaulieu also found that the terms of incentive contracts can influence a physician's decision to affiliate
with a plan or practice. If incentive arrangements influence physicians' exit and entry patterns, then HMOs need to take
preferences regarding incentives into account when constructing physician networks. 
  11. Robinson (2001) reaches a similar conclusion based on his review of the medical literature. 
  12. For an excellent discussion of this large literature see Phelps (1992). 
  13. Fears of malpractice suits are likely a central component in the formation of physician norms, and we discuss these
in subsequent sections. 
  14. We could extend our model to include any number of HMOs as well as old-style indemnity plans, but the key results
are easiest to communicate in a model with only two HMOs. To further simplify things we assume that each HMO offers
only one plan. Allowing HMOs to offer multiple plans would complicate the model without altering its basic conclusions. 
  15. This model of product market competition in the first stage builds off of Gal-Or's (1985) model of differentiated
product oligopoly. In the context of HMO competition, the Cournot assumption means that HMOs set target market shares
and then set prices to achieve those targets. This focus on market share is roughly consistent with informal discussions
about strategy the authors have had with a local HMO. 
  16. In principle the model can be extended to include direct and intrusive monitoring, the informal 'steering' of patients
to low-cost providers and more complex contracts, but these features would greatly complicate the analysis. 
See Ma and McGuire (forthcoming) for a discussion of other incentive instruments available to HMOs. 
  17. We also incorporate   directly into the physicians' objective function, but this is a matter of analytical convenience
rather than an economically significant aspect of the model. 
  18. More specifically, we treat physicians as making a two-stage decision, first choosing whether to join HMO i and then
choosing a style, si, for patients from HMO i. At the second stage, doctors choose the unconstrained maximum, ignoring
the absolute practice norm. In the first stage they anticipate their second stage decision and only join if it yields an
acceptable style (si    ). 
  19. In assessing  , the physician is assumed to not  include his own style. In other words,   is the highest practice style
used by another physician. While   is endogenous to the model, it is exogenous from the point of view of a physician.
This assumption allows us to avoid having a discontinuity at si =  . The value of   is assumed to be known by all
physicians. 
  20. We chose this specific functional form because it allows us to obtain a simple closed form solution for the
equilibrium and expresses the key idea that physician utility drops the further away the chosen style is from the
maximum. A notable feature of this functional form is that the marginal disutility of lowering one's style below the
maximum decreases the farther one gets from the maximum. This form would be sensible if the saliency of thecomparisons decreased as the difference between practice styles grew. In an unpublished appendix, we present an
alternative specification that has the opposite property, i.e. that the marginal disutility of comparisons increases with
distance from the maximum. Specifically we model the disutility from practicing relatively low cost medicine as  ( -si)2
for   < si and zero otherwise. We derive a closed form solution for this alternative function and show using simulations
that it has the same basic properties as the version of the model presented here. We reserve these results for an
unpublished appendix because of the very complex equations that characterize the closed-form solution. 
  21. Note that   does not appear in the first order condition. This implies that all physicians, subject to joining an HMO's
network, select the same practice style, a property that greatly simplifies the modeling to follow. It does not imply that all
physicians appear identical to consumers, since physicians can differ along many dimensions (e.g. location, bedside
manners, availability of extended office hours) other than practice style.
The second order condition for the physician's maximization problem holds so long as di  >  . Since the optimal style si
goes to infinity as di goes to  /  from above, this condition always holds for any incentive contract the HMO would wish
to write. 
  22. Because costs are linear in the number of patients, minimizing the HMO's cost per patient is equivalent to
minimizing costs. Cost minimization is implied by profit maximization. 
  23. Since   is distributed uniformly between 0 and A, the marginal physician in HMO 1's network of size  1 will have 
= ( 1/D)A. Rearranging this equation gives the second constraint in (7). 
  24. To see this, it is sufficient to note that  c/ d1 < 0 for all d1 < 1. Substituting the first constraint (which holds with
equality) from (7) into (6) and differentiating,  c/ d1 = dc/ds1* s1/ d1. Given that s1 is a decreasing function of d1, as
shown by differentiating (5), and costs are an increasing function of s1, the derivative  c/ d1 must be negative. 
  25. It may also be that some physicians do not join either network. We can think of these physicians as working
exclusively with patients having traditional indemnity insurance. To simplify the exposition, we do not incorporate this
sector into our formal model. 
  26. The possibility of spillover effects between HMO networks was first noted and analyzed by Beaulieu (2000). 
  27. Even if patients cannot evaluate the clinical practice styles of physicians, they can still have preferences over
physicians because they can evaluate non-clinical attributes of doctors such as location of offices, office hours, age,
gender, and communication style. Factors such as recommendations from peers may also lead to patients having
references over physicians. Such factors could be built explicitly into the model by using a Hotelling type framework.
However, this would complicate the model while gaining us little insight. 
  28. Since  1    2, p1 > p2 or no consumers would join HMO 2. Since utility is an increasing function of x, the segment
of available customers [0,X] must be divided into two segments with the upper segment joining one of the HMOs and the
lower segment joining neither. Finally, the condition for joining HMO 1 over HMO 2 is bx 1 - p1   bx 2 - p2.
Rearranging, this becomes x   (p1 - p2)/b( 1 -  2). Thus, the segment of insured consumers can further be subdivided
into two segments, with the upper segment joining HMO 1 and the lower joining HMO 2. 
  29. We are assuming that parameter values are such that both HMOs will employ interior solutions for  . For simplicity,
we are assuming that each physician can serve an unlimited number of patients. For greater verisimilitude, we could add
a constraint on the ratio of qi/ i. If this constraint were to be binding, it would provide additional push against a race to
the bottom. 
  30. To prove that equations (21) - (24) are a global maximum we must prove that neither HMO can improve its payoff
by switching roles, i.e. that, given HMO 1's network, HMO 2 can't do better by building a larger network than HMO 1.
Analogously we must also demonstrate that given HMO 2's network, HMO 1 can't do better by building a smaller
network than HMO 2. To establish this we derive each HMO's optimal strategy if it switched roles with the other. We
then we compare each HMO's maximum payoff after switching roles with the payoff from remaining in the current role.
We find that so long as     0.5 , the equilibrium in (21)-(24) represents a global profit maximum. Since this is also the
condition for the HMOs providing differentiated products in equilibrium, it holds for all cases of interest. 
  31. This result is not likely to be undone by adverse selection. In numerical simulations available from the authors, wedemonstrate that in settings where x, the parameter governing an individual consumer's willingness to pay for large
networks, is positively correlated with the HMO member's expected medical costs, the HMOs still engage in differentiated
product market competition in which HMO 1 offers larger physician networks and lower powered physician incentives
than HMO 2. 
  32. The pull to the top generated by relative practice norms depends on the existence of differentiated products. The
effect exists because physicians can compare their work for HMOs with tight cost controls with the work they (or others)
are doing for HMOs with looser controls. 
  33. We do not place much emphasis on profits in our analysis, because the results are sensitive to functional form
assumptions. In the context of these assumptions, however, we can show profits of HMO 1 increase as   increases. The
profits of HMO 2, in contrast, are not a monotonic function of  . 
  34. The welfare implications of increasing   for those who remain insured are worked out in Appendix 1. 
  35. Gaynor, Rebitzer and Taylor (2001) document a case in which these regulations substantially weakened an HMO's
incentive contracts. They also present some evidence that these weaker contracts increased the HMOs medical utilization
costs. 
  36. A third regulatory strategy would be to require that HMOs reveal the details of their physician incentive contracts to
patients. Meaningful patient disclosure is limited by the complexity of incentive plans (Gaynor, Rebitzer, and Taylor
2001) and the limited ability of patients to understand even basic information about incentives (Miller and Horowitz 2000;
and Hall, Kid, and Dugan 2000 ) 
  37. In signing the derivatives, we maintain the assumption that we are in the region that generates strict product
differentiation in the absence of any constraint; e.g.     0.5  . 
  38. This may seem surprising, but note that the direct effect of increasing fixed costs per patient are smaller for HMO 1
than for HMO 2 since the former serves a relatively small number of patients. This cost advantage for HMO 1 is
sufficiently large to reverse the direct effects due to an increase in fixed costs. 
  39. Medical costs can be treated as having two components, direct costs of medical care and malpractice damages. An
increase in practice style can be assumed to increase the direct costs but decrease the malpractice damages. The larger,
certeris paribus, malpractice damages are, the more important the second component becomes. If shifting responsibility
for malpractice damages onto HMOs increases the size of these damages, the marginal cost of increased practice style is
lowered by the greater savings generated from avoiding malpractice claims. 
  40. Ultimately, the magnitude of the increase in uninsured is an empirical question that cannot be assessed without
calibrating our model to real world parameters. Studdert et. al. (1999) suggest the increase in costs from increased HMO
liability is quite uncertain. 
  41. On the margin, the worst off consumer in an HMO either switches HMOs or moves to being uninsured as 
increases. For our calculations, we treat this consumer as if she stayed with the same HMO. If this consumer would have
been better off staying with the same HMO than she was prior to the change in   (although not as well off as by
switching), all consumers in the same HMO with higher values of x must also be made better off by the increase in   . 
  42. This derivative is positive if we maintain the necessary and sufficient condition for product differentiation (0 <   <
0.5 ). 
  43. This follows because some consumers in HMO 1 switch to HMO 2 when   increases, even though their utility would
increase if they stayed in HMO 1. It follows that HMO 2 consumers with values of x  close to those who switch from
HMO 1 to HMO 2 will also experience an increase in utility. 